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ARTICLE
CLIMATE CHANGE, FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: ARE THINGS
HEATING UP IN THE BOARDROOM?
Perry E. Wallace
INTRODUCTION
What should American corporations and their fiduciaries do in
the face of the rapidly emerging but still incomplete science, policy,
and law on climate change? Considering the imposing global "car-
bon footprint"' that they collectively leave,2 what duties apply to
American corporations and their managers under U.S. corporate
and securities laws?
As the state of knowledge about climate change evolves, so do
the related discourse, debate, and responses. A dialogue about
fundamental regulatory issues such as "standard setting," "conver-
gence," monitoring, and enforcement has begun in earnest. These
developments are all the more remarkable because consequential
leaders and policymakers direct significant opposition towards
proactive climate change policies.4 Further, this opposition (which
appears to be diminishing almost daily) renders knowledge and
consensus about the ultimate nature and reach of a full-blown
global regulatory system both less discernible and less certain.
While most businesses' greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are not
regulated under any formal regime, the approaching climate
change regulatory environment is considerably more discernable
and certain than in the past. These two realities, taken together,
1 See Carbon Footprint Ltd., What is a Carbon Footprint?, http://www.carbonfootprint.
com/carbonfootprint.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2007) (describing a carbon footprint as "a
measure of the impact human activities have on the environment in terms of the amount of
green house gases produced, measured in units of carbon dioxide.").
2 See Perry E. Wallace, Global Climate Change and the Challenge to Modern American
Corporate Governance, 55 SMU L. REV. 493, 494 (2002).
3 See discussion infra Section I(B).
4 See discussion infra Section I(A) (describing emerging trends in climate change science
and the opposition to the emerging consensus on the subject).
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raise certain significant questions for corporations and their man-
agers: Do U.S. corporate and securities laws impose any duties on
American corporations and their fiduciaries with respect to climate
change? Or are there no such duties, since most corporate opera-
tions are not affected at present by any specific climate change reg-
ulations? Alternately, do duties exist requiring such actions as
public disclosure, inventory assessment, risk assessment, and cost-
benefit analysis? What if the pace of either scientific discovery or
regulatory expansion continues, or even accelerates? To what
degree would a failure to act promptly subject a company and its
fiduciaries to liabilities or to other expressions of opprobrium by
the capital markets and market actors? Do corporate and securi-
ties laws even matter, given that economic and political pressures
drive corporate action and that the prospect of GHG regulation
continues to emerge?
This Article takes up certain questions about climate change that
are gaining attention in some boardrooms and, certainly should be
in all others. Part I describes the current discourse and debate of
climate change issues in the United States. Here, the American
corporation is introduced as a principal actor. Part II views current
and emerging climate change science, law, and policy through the
prism of American corporate and securities law, the primary legal
framework defining the duties and liabilities of corporations, direc-
tors, and officers to shareholders and other market actors.
The principal focus of this Article is on the corporate and securi-
ties law obligations, if any, of such actors during a period in which
no comprehensive system of specific positive legal duties to control
GHGs is present, and in which events and discoveries yield increas-
ingly concerning evidence of climate change's potential negative
effects. Further, this Article takes into account that such evidence
may soon lead to an overall regulatory structure imposing signifi-
cant legal duties. Put in the admittedly provocative language of
environmental policy, is there anything approaching a "precaution-
ary principle"5 effect in post-Enron era corporate and securities
law?
5 See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 23 (2004):
[A] significant aspect of environmental protection law that derives from the
nature of ecological injury is its primary focus on the prevention, rather than
redress, of environmental harms. Redress is rarely a viable option because of
the sheer impossibility or at least limited effectiveness of cleaning up environ-
mental harm once it takes place.
See also CAss R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, 102-05 (2002) (critiquing the principle
emphasizing its limits). ANDREW J. HOFFMAN, GETTING AHEAD OF THE CURVE: CORPO-
Fiduciary Duty and Corporate Disclosure
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE AMERICAN CORPORATION:
DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT STATUS
The following discussion briefly describes some notable develop-
ments in the science and law of climate change as a prelude to a
discussion of the corporation and its fiduciaries as key actors in the
climate change discourse.
A. Science: Trends and Uncertainties
Although scientists have known of and studied global warming
and climate change for years, it was the work of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), created in 1988,6 that
helped bring knowledge of climate change to policymakers, envi-
ronmental advocates, and the broader public. Compiling and stud-
ying the work of experts from around the world, the IPCC began to
provide Assessment Reports of existing, reliable knowledge about
all aspects of climate change.
The 2001 Third Assessment Report, which "builds upon.., past
assessments and incorporates new results from the past five years
of climate research,"7 concluded that a pattern of global warming
and climate change is developing that can only be addressed
through a global climate change programmatic effort. IPCC com-
munications and news reports observe that the 2007 Fourth Assess-
ment Report (not yet issued at the time this Article was written)
will confirm more forcefully than ever the reality and the urgency
surrounding climate change.'
RATE STRATEGIES THAT ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE (2006), http://www.pewclimate.org/
global-warming-in-depth/all-reports/corporate-strategies. This Pew Center on Global Cli-
mate Change report provides guidance on how to convert early action, a principal by-
product of the precautionary principle, into a positive corporate benefit. The report
emphasizes strategic timing, an appropriate level of commitment, influence in public policy
development and creation of business opportunities.
6 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, About the IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/
about/index.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2007).
7 D.L. Albritton et al., Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC
BASIS 23 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds. 2001) available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/
wgl/pdf/WG1_TAR-FRONT.PDF (providing the contribution of Working Group I to the
Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).
8 See Richard Alley et al., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wgl.htm
(providing preliminary summary of work by Working Group I of the IPCC); Neil Adger et
al., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND
VULNERABILITY (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm (providing
preliminary summary of work by Working Group II of the IPCC); Terry Barker et al.,
Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION (2007) available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg3.htm (providing preliminary summary of work by
2008]
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In addition to the IPCC reports, other reports and studies con-
tinue to appear, with scientists at influential organizations such as
the NASA Goddard Institute of Space Studies, the Potsdam Insti-
tute for Climate Impact Research,9 and the Max Planck Institute
for Meteorology10 all setting forth the case for action with respect
to climate change.
While there is a general consensus around climate change sci-
ence, debate and uncertainty still exist. At one level, questions
remain regarding scientific certainty, thus making it important that
socio-economic impacts be analyzed through continued profes-
sional inquiry on both sides." At yet another level, however,
opposing political, economic, and social interests infuse the debate
with a considerable amount of partisanship that often confuses and
confounds overall progress in the area.12
Even with the debate, however, climate change policy develop-
ments and practices in both the governmental and corporate arenas
Working Group III of the IPCC); Fiona Harvey, Damage from Global Warming 'to
worsen', FIN. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2007, at 9.
9 See Juliet Eilperin, Debate on Climate Shifts to Issue of Irreparable Change; Some
Experts on Global Warming Foresee 'Tipping Point' When It Is Too Late to Act, WASH.
POST, Jan. 29, 2006, at A01.
10 See Press Release, Max Planck Soc'y, Climate Change More Rapid than Ever (Sept.
30, 2005), available at http://www.mpg.de/english/illustrationsDocumentation/documenta-
tion/pressReleases2005/pressRelease200O59301/genPDF.pdf
11 See, e.g., Perspectives on Climate Change: Joint Hearing with Engergy & Commerce
Subcommittee on Energy & Air Quality, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Bjorn
Lomborg), available at http://democrats.science.house.gov/; Perspectives on Climate
Change: Joint Hearing with Energy & Commerce Subcommittee on Energy & Air Quality,
110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of James M. Inhofe, Member, Senate Comm. On Env't and
Pub. Works), available at http://epw.senate.gov/; BiORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL
ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF THE WORLD (2001).
12 Envtl. Def., See What's At Stake? Tell Exxon's New CEO-End the Disinformation
Campaign, http://action.environmentaldefense.org/campaign/exxonmobil2/explanation
(last visited Dec. 28, 2007). Here, the organization Environmental Defense accuses the oil
giant ExxonMobil of carrying on a "multi-million dollar campaign to spread-through
'think' tanks, quasi-journalists and misleading public advertisements-propaganda dressed
up like science, all to convince the public that global warming is a hoax and to keep
America at a standstill." Environmentalists have directed the accusation at ExxonMobil in
particular, naming organizations such as the Competitive Enterprise Institute, The Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute and the George C. Marshall Institute as recipients of corporate
funding for studies about climate change. See also Letter from Bob Ward, Senior Manager
of The Royal Soc'y, to Nick Thomas, Dir. of Corporate Affairs of Esso UK ltd. (Sept. 4,
2006), available at http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2006/09/19/
LettertoNick.pdf (accusing ExxonMobil of promoting an "inaccurate and misleading view
of the science of climate change" and of providing financial support to various organiza-
tions that have been "misinforming the public" on the .ame subject).
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progress.1 3 And although some of this progress is based on volun-
tary programs, legal methods are playing an increasing role.
B. Law: Trends and Uncertainties
1. International Law
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment Framework Convention on Climate Change 4 (UNFCCC)
seeks to achieve "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system. 1 5 The UNFCCC was
signed at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Earth Summit).
16
Acting through "Conference[s] of the Parties" to the UNFCCC,
the parties signatory to the convention continued to meet and fur-
ther develop this initial body of law of climate change. On Decem-
ber 11, 1997, they signed the Kyoto Protocol,17 in which the
countries agreed to meet specific, binding targets and timetables.
Although the Protocol was signed, tensions on many levels per-
sisted, with the United States ultimately deciding not to be a
party.18 Continuing the progress toward establishment of a full-
blown global climate change regulatory framework, from Novem-
ber 28 to December 10, 2005,- delegates to the U.N. Climate
Change Conference in Montreal concluded a decade-long round of
negotiations that "launched the Kyoto Protocol and opened a new
round of talks to begin considering the future of the international
13 See, e.g., SIR NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE (2007). In this highly-regarded work, Sir Nicholas Stern, an advisor to British
Prime Minister Tony Blair, provides a comprehensive analysis of the economic aspects of
climate change, with conclusions that basically underscore and follow from the basic find-
ings of mainstream scientific trends.
14 U.N. Conference on Env't and Dev.t, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Preamble, New York, May 9, 1992, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. 849, 854, available at http://
www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
15 Id. at art. 2.
16 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.
int/essentialbackground/convention/status of ratification/items/2631.php (last visited
Dec. 28, 2007).
17 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/
kpeng.pdf.
18 See Wallace, supra note 2, at 504-08 (describing the dynamics, tensions, and politics
around the Protocol).
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climate effort."19 The conference "was a historic first-it served
both as the 11th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the
[UNFCCC] (COP 11), and, following Kyoto's entry into force in
February [2005], as the 1st Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol (COP/MOP 1)."2o But the complex dynamics continued, as
before, with the United States expressing considerable resistance
to the emerging international climate change regime.2'
2. The United States: The States and Cities Take the Lead
In the absence of U.S. adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, and with
no significant or effective federal legislation specifically addressing
climate change, other U.S. actors, both governmental and non-gov-
ernmental, contribute to the legal and policy infrastructure regard-
ing climate change. Encouraged by a number of different factors,
several states and municipalities recently proposed or adopted
legal measures to address climate change:
State leaders and their constituents are concerned about the
projected toll of climate change on their states. In the
coastal states, the main worry is the impact of rising sea
levels. In agricultural states, it is lost farm productivity. An
in the dry Western states, it is the prospect of worsening
droughts. ... Many states view policies that address climate
change not as a burden on commerce but as an economic
opportunity. These states are trying to position themselves
as leaders in new markets related to climate action: produc-
ing and selling alternative fuels, ramping up renewable
energy exports, attracting high-tech business, and selling
greenhouse gas emission reduction credits.22
19 Pewclimate.org, Summary of COP 11 and COP/MOP 1, http://www.pewclimate.org/
pressroom/newsletter/dec05.cfm (last visited Dec. 28, 2007) (commenting on the Kyoto
Protocol).
20 Id.
21 See Washington Furious over Martin's Climate Change Comments, CBC NEWS,'Dec. 9,
2005, available at http://www.cbc.ca/story/canadavotes2006/national/2005/12/09/katrina-
global-warming-bush-martin.html (reporting that the "White House has officially com-
plained about Prime Minister Paul Martin's comments this week at the climate change
conference in Montreal."); Paul Martin, Prime Minister, Can., Address at the U.N. Confer-
'ence on Climate Change (Dec. 7, 2005) (commenting that "[t]he time is past to seek com-
fort in denial. The time is past to pretend that any nation can Stand alone, isolated from
the global community .... "were seen by some as a criticism of the U.S. position on climate
change).
22 PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 101: UNDERSTANDING'
AND RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 42 (2007), available at http://www.pew
climate.org/docUploads/ClimatelOl-FULL_121406_065519.pdf. See also GLOBAL CLI-
MATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 313-449 (Michael B. Gerrard, ed., 2007).
[Vol. 26:293298
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Cognizant of the shortcomings of "piecemeal" or "patchwork"
policies, many states participate in regional initiatives, seeking
greater efficiency, effectiveness, and uniformity in the implementa-
tion of climate solutions. For example, in December, 2005, the
governors of seven Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states entered
into the "Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative" (RGGI), a cap-and-
trade system for carbon dioxide at power plants.23 In addition,
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island are cooperating
with the RGGI to develop a GHG registry called the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Registry.24
On the West Coast, the "Western Governors' Association Clean
and Diversified Energy Initiative" includes eighteen western
states. Six New England states began in 2001 cooperating with
the Eastern Canadian Premiers (NEG-ECP) climate action plan to
achieve emissions-reduction goals. 26 "Powering the Plains" is a
regional project that includes the Dakotas, Minnesota, Iowa, Wis-
consin, and the Canadian Province of Manitoba; it focuses on alter-
native energy and technology and climate-friendly agricultural
development.27
Litigation over climate change now makes it necessary for public
companies and their fiduciaries to become familiar with the legal
implications of climate change. In July 2004, the states of Califor-
nia, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, and Wisconsin, along with the City of New York, filed suit
against the five largest GHG-emitting companies in the United
States: the American Electric Power Company, the Southern Com-
pany, the Tennessee Valley Authority, Xcel Energy, Inc. and
Cinergy Corporation. Collectively, these companies are the own-
ers or operators of "174 fossil fuel burning power plants in 20 states
that emit some 650 million tons of carbon dioxide each year-
almost a quarter of the U.S. utility industry's annual carbon diox-
ide emissions and about 10 percent of the nation's total.
28
23 PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 22, at 43.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 43-44.
26 Id.
27 Id. See also Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Early 2007 States News Archives,
http://www.pewclimate.org/what-s-being-done/in the-states/late06earlyO7.cfm (last vis-
ited Dec. 28 2007).
28 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing
on "political question" grounds).; Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney General
Andrew M. Cuomo, Eight States & NYC Sue Top Five U.S. Global Warming Polluters (July
21, 2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/jul/jul21a_04.html.
2008] 299
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This suit reflects the view that "[t]he debate over global warming
is gaining a new dimension: litigation. ' 29 At present, a flurry of
lawsuits are pending against companies and governmental entities
seeking a variety of forms of relief, including damages and injunc-
tive relief in the form of climate change regulation.3 ° Perhaps the
most important case is Massachusetts et al. v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency.3 In that case, the Supreme Court agreed with
twelve states, several other political subdivisions, and numerous
non-profit organizations that the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate
GHG emissions from new motor vehicles. 32  The decision is
expected "to affect industry and the economy in a big way."
33
II. CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW DUTIES IMPLICATED BY
THE EMERGING SCIENCE, LAW, AND POLICY
OF CLIMATE CHANGE
In the corporate arena, companies and their shareholders are
increasingly addressing climate change by performing research and
adopting specific policies and practices. Institutional shareholders,
including environmental groups, pension funds, and socially-
responsible investment organizations, are especially active.34
Events and activities in and around the corporate sector continue
29 Suing Over Climate Change, BBC NEWS, Apr. 3, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/science/nature/2910017.stm. See also Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Attor-
ney General Andrew M. Cuomo, States, Cities, Environmental Groups Sue Bush Adminis-
tration On Global Warming, Challenge EPA's Refusal To Reduce Greenhouse Gas
Pollution (Oct. 23, 2003), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/oct/oct23a_03.
html; James C. Chen & Joanne Rotondl, Raising the Heat: Climate Change Litigation in the
United States, SUSTAINABLE DEV., ECOSYSTEMS AND CLIMATE CHANGE COMM. NEWSLET-
TER (Am. Bar Ass'n, Chi., I.L.), Apr. 2005, at 2-7, available at http://www.abanet.org/envi-
ron/committees/climatechange/newsletter/archiveslist.html (describing a number of major
cases).
30 See generally JUSTIN R. PIDOT, GLOBAL WARMING IN THE COURTS (2006), available
at http:l/www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current-research/documents/GWLReport.pdf.
31 Massachussets v. Envt. Prot. Agency, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007).
32 Id. at 1463.
33 Jeffrey Ball & Mike Spector, Industries Show Uncertainty Over Ruling's Impact,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2007, at A10.
34 See, e.g., CERES, CAPITAL TO THE CAPITOL: INVESTORS AND BUSINESS FOR U.S. CLI-
MATE ACTION (2007), www.ceres.org/pub/docs/Call to-action.pdf (a statement by "CEOs,
senior officers and trustees of institutional investors, asset managers and corporations who
recognize the risks and opportunities of global climate change, which we have begun to
address voluntarily." The group called on the government "to create national policies to
establish regulatory certainty and provide strong incentives"). See also Petition for Inter-
pretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure, Sept. 18, 2007, http://www.sec.gov/rules/peti-
tions/2007/petn4-547.pdf (a broad coalition of investors, state officials with regulatory and
fiscal management responsibilities, and environmental groups petitioned the Securities and
[Vol. 26:293
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to mount, and shareholder action plays a major role in focusing
corporations and their fiduciaries on the subject of climate change.
The growth of environmental regulation in the United States
triggered the application of numerous other areas of law, 35 includ-
ing corporate and securities laws.36 In the latter instance, this
effect occurred because of the extensive compliance requirements
and the aggressive enforcement activities of modern environmental
regulation. These essential "drivers" of progress and growth in
American environmental law impose substantial economic and
financial impacts on regulated companies. Accordingly, these
impacts are just the type of "material" matters affecting compa-
nies, their shareholders, and the financial markets that are the con-
cern of the corporate and securities laws.
The following discussion addresses the implications of emerging
climate change science, law, and policy-first under federal securi-
ties law, and second, under state corporate fiduciary duty law. The
discussion takes up issues that are the focus of advocacy and dis-
pute, and it also addresses potential future areas of engagement.
A. Federal Securities Law and Climate Change
Investor protection and market integrity are fundamental objec-
tives of the federal securities laws. "[F]ull and fair disclosure" of
"material" matters, the principal vehicle for achievement of these
objectives, is thus a substantial and pervasive duty of regulated
"public" companies.37 Further, this regulatory approach has some
degree of impact on corporate governance. Some are even of the
Exchange Commission to require publicly-traded companies to assess and fully disclose
their fihancial risks from climate change).
35 See ELIZABETH GLASS GELTMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS TRANSAC-
TIONS (1994) (dealing with environmental issues as they affect a wide range of business
problems and necessarily bringing into play areas of law such as real property, trust, bank-
ing, corporate, securities, bankruptcy, franchise, insurance, and criminal law).
36 See id. at 235-322, 853-919; Perry E. Wallace, Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities
Under the Securities Laws: The Potential of Securities-Market-Based Incentives for Pollution
Control, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1093 (1993) [hereinafter Wallace, Environmental Disclo-
sure]; Perry E. Wallace, Liability of Corporations and Corporate Officers, Directors and
Shareholders Under Superfund: Should Corporate and Agency Law Concepts Apply? 14 J.
CORP. L. 839 (1989) [hereinafter Wallace, Liability Under Superfund].
37 See JAMES D. Cox, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1 (2004):
The securities laws exist because of the unique informational needs of inves-
tors. Unlike cars and other tangible products, securities are not inherently
valuable . . Deciding whether to buy or sell a security ... requires reliable
information about such matters as the issuer's financial condition, products
and markets, management, and competitive and regulatory climate.
2008]
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view that "[t]he ... [SEC] has aspired to regulate corporate gov-
ernance since its inception and, from time to time, has exploited
scandals in the public securities markets to achieve this purpose. "38
In any event, this body of law is necessarily part of any contempo-
rary discussion of corporate behavior, especially in the wake of the
Enron scandals and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Discussions of the potential applicability of securities law to cli-
mate change issues reflect much about the history and develop-
ment of the SEC disclosure regulations applicable to
environmental matters generally. During the 1970s, the SEC's
interest in disclosures of environmental liabilities began after Con-
gress and environmental regulators began responding to public
concern about environmental problems. 39 Beginning with the SEC
Release Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environ-
ment and Civil Rights,4" the SEC continually found its pronounce-
ments to be inadequate-the public sentiment about the
importance of environmental protection was growing, which
pushed the SEC towards more expansive and demanding environ-
mental disclosure requirements. 41
In the present SEC regulatory structure, well-established regula-
tory provisions require that security holders and the securities mar-
kets be supplied with material information about environmental
liabilities and obligations.42 The following discussion centers, first,
on the basic SEC provisions for environmental disclosure; second,
on the potential effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; and, third, on
final observations about future prospects for applicability.
1. Basic SEC Environmental Disclosure Provisions With
Potential Relevance to Climate Change Issues
In large part, the basic SEC environmental disclosure require-
ments turn on the existence of laws creating substantial environ-
mental liabilities and obligations. This inquiry will probe not only
that domain, but also (to the extent they exist) disclosure require-
38 Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas - The Securities and
Exchange Commission takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 80
(2005).
39 See Wallace, Environmental Disclosure, supra note 36, at 1102, 1102-05 (describing
the evolution of SEC environmental disclosure).
40 Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil Rights,
Exchange Act Release No. 9252, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23, 507 (July 19, 1971).
41 Wallace, Environmental Disclosure, supra note 36, at 1103.
42 See generally MARK A. STACH, DISCLOSING ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY UNDER THE
SECURITIES LAWS 4-1 - 4-22 (1995).
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ments based on the potential impact of climate change phenomena
per se on a public company's economic and financial position.
Also, perhaps as a sub-category, consideration is given to any
potential impact on disclosure that might flow from the "trends,"
''uncertainties," and "probabilities" relative to future enactment of
regulatory measures addressing climate change.
The basic areas of SEC environmental disclosure regulation are
the following:
" Legal Proceedings;
" Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condi-
tion and Results of Operations (MD&A);
" Description of Business;
" Accounting Contingent Liabilities; and
" Anti-Fraud liability for Material Misstatements and
Omissions.
As the discussion below will show, perhaps the most pertinent
provisions are the requirements to disclose certain legal proceed-
ings and the MD&A requirement.
a. Legal Proceedings
As will be discussed below, a considerable amount of already-
commenced litigation seeks to press governments and companies
to implement GHG reduction practices, and to obtain damages
and other remedies from companies. The trend towards increasing
litigation and the growing evidence of materially consequential
global warming accordingly renders the question of applicability of
securities law disclosure rules on legal proceedings increasingly
relevant.
Item 103 of Regulation S-K requires affected companies to
describe "any material pending legal proceedings, other than ordi-
nary routine litigation incidental to the business. '4 3 Importantly,
Instruction 5 to Item 103 states that environmental proceedings are
not "ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business" and pro-
vides further guidance regarding disclosure.44 That is, disclosure is
required if the proceeding (1) is "material," (2) involves claims,
sanctions, capital expenditures, or charges in an amount exceeding
ten percent of the company's assets on a consolidated basis, or (3)
a governmental authority is a party to material proceedings "pend-
ing" or "known to be contemplated" and there are potential mone-
43 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2006).
44 Id. at Instruction 5.
2008]
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tary sanctions (unless the company reasonably believes there will
be no sanctions, or they will be less than $100,000).
4 1
The pertinent issues for climate change litigation have to do with
the particulars of the rule. One key requirement for Item 103 dis-
closure is the "materiality" of the proceeding, which is defined as a
proceeding in which "there is a substantial likelihood that a reason-
able investor would attach importance" to it.46 Further, to qualify
for SEC disclosure, cases brought under creative "toxic tort" and
other common law theories must be such that "the gravamen of the
complaint alleges violations of environmental statutes as well as
alleging traditional torts such as strict product liability and negli-
gence. '47 As will be discussed below, these and other require-
ments, including the influence of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin
Number 92 on the "disaggregated disclosure of individually mate-
rial claims, 48 often provide a basis for companies to avoid disclo-
sure, at least according to environmental advocates. Of course,
one possible alternative basis of a disclosure obligation is the
broadest, most general one-that the proceeding qualifies as
"material" under the general provisions of Item 103 so long as it is
not "ordinary" and exceeds ten percent of the companies consoli-
dated current assets.49
Several major legal actions could affect public companies, either
directly or indirectly, and trigger a disclosure requirement. One
prominent example is Connecticut v. American Electric Power,5 ° in
which eight states, the city of New York, and three land trusts filed
nuisance suits against the five largest carbon dioxide emitters in the
United States. Also, in California v. General Motors,51 the state of
California filed suit on a public nuisance theory against six manu-
facturers of motor vehicles for contributing to global warming. The
45 Id. at Instruction 5 (A), (B) & (C).
46 See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison
Co., 688 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. I11. 1989) (expressing approval of the "magnitude [of effect]/
probability [of occurrence]" test of materiality in relation to "contingent or speculative
information or events."); 17 C.F.R. §§203.405, 240.12b-2 (2006).
47 STACH, supra note 42, at 3-21 (discussing SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92, 58
Fed. Reg. 32,843, 32,845 (July 14, 1993) [hereinafter SAB No. 92])
48 STACH, supra note 42. See also SAB No. 92, supra note 47.
49 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2006), generally and Instructions 1, 2.
50 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing
on "political question" grounds). See also PIDOT, supra note 30 at 15 (discussing climate
change litigation).
51 See California v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547 (N.D.Cal. Sept.
17, 2007) (order granting defendants' motion to dismiss on "political question" grounds).
See also PIDOT, supra note 30, at 16.
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suit seeks damages in compensation for California's expenditures
for planning, monitoring, and infrastructure changes tied to climate
change. In Comer v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance,52 fourteen indi-
viduals filed a class action suit against eight named oil companies,
one hundred unnamed oil and refining entities, and thirty-one coal
companies seeking damages based on a nuisance theory. Specifi-
cally, they alleged that defendant companies' GHG emissions
increased the ferocity of Hurricane Katrina and thus increased
damage to the plaintiffs' property..
Actions grounded in nuisance theory are filed directly against
companies; however, a growing number of companies and trade
associations are intervening in cases that have major implications
for GHG-emitting companies and industries. Some of these cases
are actions against federal, state or local governments, of which the
recent decision in Massachusetts v. EPA5 3 (described in Section
I(B) of this Article) is the most prominent. Another notable cate-
gory of cases are those filed by corporate interests against state or
local governments on the ground that GHG measures instituted at
their respective levels are preempted by the Clean Air Act.54 What
makes these lawsuits "material" for purposes of SEC disclosure is
that victories could ultimately entail emissions control require-
ments, including major capital investments, monitoring, and other
expenditures. Considering the growing number of new filings, it
would appear that disclosure about legal proceedings concerning
climate change will be increasingly difficult to avoid in the future.
At the same time, however, victory on the merits in these cases is
far from certain.
Generally, materiality, causation, and damages issues are key in
the climate change area. Their proof is directly dependent on the
evolution and the established consensus concerning climate change
and its effects. In this regard, some major physical manifestations
of its effects probably must be present to support the clear, sub-
stantial, and present evidence that will be required for success on
the merits. On the one hand, some would argue that this has
already come to pass. One professional states that "there is no
doubt at all now that the [2001 IPCC's] third assessment report has
52 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33123 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 23. 2006). See also PIDOT, supra note
30, at 16.
53 PIDOT, supra note 30, at 1.
54 Id. at 2.
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taken forward the legal significance of the science""5 in terms of
levels of proof. Others are not convinced, citing questions regard-
ing the specific identification of polluters and victims, as well as
pleading and proof of materiality, causation, and damages and
other relief.
5 6
In any event, the litigation is ongoing. A number of the cases are
of a rather high-profile nature, with requests for relief potentially
entailing very large economic impacts for companies with sizeable
GHG emissions.57 Accordingly, the related questions about securi-
ties law disclosure are bound to become increasingly prominent.
b. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations
The central objective of the disclosure requirement entitled
"Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition
and Results of Operations" (MD&A) is to "give investors an
opportunity to look at the [company] through the eyes of manage-
ment by providing a historical and prospective analysis of the...
[company's] financial condition and results of operations.""8 There
is a "particular emphasis on the registrant's prospects for the
future."59 The MD&A requires disclosure of the following: known
trends or demands, commitments, events, or uncertainties that will
result or are reasonably likely to result in material changes in a
company's liquidity; material commitments for capital expendi-
tures or known material trends, favorable or unfavorable, in the
company's capital resources; known trends or uncertainties that
have or are reasonably expected to have a material favorable or
unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from con-
tinuing operations; and off-balance-sheet arrangements that have
or are reasonably likely to have a current or future effect on the
company's financial condition, results of operations, liquidity, or
capital resources.
6°
55 Suing Over Climate Change, BBC NEWS, Apr. 3, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/science/nature/2910017.stm (quoting Peter Roderick, Attorney, Friends of the
Earth International).
56 Id. (quoting Julian Morris, Environmental Policy Specialist, International Policy
Network).
57 See id.
58 Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Opera-
tions, Securities Act Release No. 6835, Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, Investment
Company Act Release No. 16,961, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,227, 22,436 (May 18, 1989) [hereinafter
MD&A Release].
59 Id.
60 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2006).
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A key requirement in the MD&A is materiality. Using a rather
different formulation than the well-known one articulated in cases
like Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,61 the MD&A requires that a company
that knows of a trend, demand, commitment, event, or uncertainty
that will have an arguably important economic or financial impact
on the company must determine whether it is likely to come to
fruition. If such a determination is not reasonably likely, then no
disclosure is necessary. 62 If the company cannot make such a
determination, however, then it must objectively evaluate the con-
sequences of the trend, demand, commitment, event, or uncer-
tainty on the assumption it will come to fruition. Therefore,
disclosure is required unless the company affirmatively determines
that a material effect on the company's financial condition or
results of operations is not reasonably likely to occur.63
The MD&A reflects a shift in the SEC's policies toward favoring
disclosure of prospective and forward-looking information and
away from a stricter policy that limits disclosure to historical
"hard" facts.64 This policy choice is thought to be a more realistic
reflection of what investors and the markets really want. 65 Never-
theless, that new approach, combined with companies' reluctance
to increase their vulnerability to both litigation and competitors,
frequently produces less than desirable disclosures. For this rea-
son, the SEC from time to time takes steps to encourage improved
MD&A compliance.
In In re Caterpillar Inc., a much-commented-upon administrative
case, the SEC determined that the company violated MD&A
requirements.66 Specifically, in what was widely regarded as a "test
case" 67 to send a message that lax compliance would no longer be
accepted, the SEC held:
[B]oth the Annual Report on form 10-K for 1989 and the
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the first quarter of 1990
should have discussed the future uncertainties regarding...
61 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
62 MD&A Release, supra note 58, at 22,430.
63 Id.
64 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK.
L. REv. 763, 799-816 (1995).
65 Id.
66 See Caterpillar Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30532, 50 S.E.C. 903 (Mar. 31, 1992)
[hereinafter Caterpillar Inc.].
67 See Kitch, supra note 64, at 803 (stating "[a]s it turned out the Commission had had
enough of preaching. It was time for a test case, and the object of the test case turned out
to be the Caterpillar Corporation.").
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[the very real prospect of a changed operating environment
for its previously productive Brazilian subsidiary], the possi-
ble risk of Caterpillar having materially lower earnings as a
result of that risk and, to the extent reasonably practicable,
quantified the impact of such risk.68
In December 2003, well into the post-Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley
period, after a review of MD&A past filing practices (and appar-
ently with some important concerns), the SEC issued an Interpre-
tive Release seeking to improve MD&A disclosures.6 9 Throughout
this missive, one sees a constant emphasis on the need for
improved clarity, readability, thoroughness, and overall quality of
disclosure in management's discussion and analysis. Pertinent to
this discussion, the Interpretive Release emphasized certain points
regarding "focus and content":
[Companies] should identify and discuss key performance
indicators, including non-financial performance indicators,
that their management uses to manage the business and that
would be material to investors; companies must identify and
disclose known trends, events, demands, commitments and
uncertainties that are reasonably likely to have a material
effect on financial condition or operating performance. 70
Whether or not this latest guidance is merely an interpretation of
the existing disclosure rule or a Sarbanes-Oxley-induced heighten-
ing of MD&A requirements is less important than the central mes-
sage that the SEC appears more serious than ever about full and
fair disclosure in this arena. For example, the Interpretive Release
observes (in a sort of "no excuses" vein) that today, as compared to
when the MD&A requirement was introduced, companies "have
access to and use substantially more detailed and timely informa-
tion about their financial condition and operating performance. "71
Further, it states that "in identifying, discussing and analyzing
known material trends and uncertainties, companies are expected
to consider all relevant information, even if that information is not
required to be disclosed."' 72 These statements are based on the
SEC's view that "[o]ne of the most important elements necessary
68 Caterpillar Inc., supra note 66, at 912.
69 Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion and Analysis of Finan-
cial Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 8350, Exchange Act
Release No. 48,960, 81 S.E.C. Docket 2905 (Dec. 19, 2003) [hereinafter Interpretive
Release].
70 Id. at § I(B) (emphasis added).
71 Id. at § I(C).
72 Id. (emphasis added).
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to an understanding of a company's performance, and the extent to
which reported financial information is indicative of future results,
is the discussion and analysis of known trends, demands, commit-
ments, events and uncertainties."73
Based on the previous discussion, MD&A disclosure appears to
be worthy of real attention in the realm of climate change. The
requirement to disclose "trends" and "uncertainties" appears to
match up perfectly with the essential state of emerging develop-
ments around the science, law, and policy of climate change. Nota-
ble here is the SEC's emphasis on a prospective focus and its
continuing determination to require a high level of quality in the
discussion and analysis. Also, even certain technical requirements
seem to work in favor of more, rather than less, disclosure. For
example, in the "materiality" analysis, the "reasonably likely"
determinations of steps one and two that, frankly, could provide a
basis for avoidance of disclosure, must be "objectively" reasonable
and not the product of "intuition and 'gut feel.' 74 SEC guidance
on making assessments of potential environmental liabilities and
costs urges companies to base their measurements "on currently
available facts, existing technology, and presently enacted laws and
regulations... [and] consider available evidence including ... prior
experience ... other companies' . . . experience, and data released
by the Environmental Protection Agency or other organizations.
75
Further supporting the potential applicability of the MD&A to
climate change is the fact that its focus is on the driving force of
evident or looming economic and financial impacts of importance
as the basis for required disclosure (as opposed to a singular focus
on the existence of legal duties76) and the fact that the phenome-
non of climate change itself could have direct impacts of that
nature on companies. To the extent there is a trend towards enact-
ment of relevant laws at various levels, or, to the extent there is
73 Id. at III(B)(3).
74 James G. Archer et al., SEC Reporting of Environmental Liabilities, 20 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,105, 10,107 .(1990), available at http://www.elr.info/articles/vol20/20.10105.cfm.
75 SAB No. 92, supra note 42, at 32,844.
76 See, e.g., MD&A Release, supra note 58 at 22,429 (clarifying that legal obligations do
not define the scope of the disclosure requirement:
[R]egistrants should focus on ... known data. For example, Item 303(a)(2)(i)
requires a description of the registrant's material "commitments" for capital
expenditures .... However, even where no legal commitments, contractual or
otherwise, have been made, disclosure is required .... Similarly, if the same
registrant determines not to incur such expenditures, a known uncertainty
would exist regarding continuation of the current growth trend. (Emphasis
added)).
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uncertainty about the eventual nature and reach of the ultimate
regulatory framework, emerging law can also provide the basis for
a disclosure requirement where material effects are involved.
Finally, on the specific subject of uncertainties with respect to
law, the challenge posed to companies after the 1990 Amendments
to the Clean Air Act, but before promulgation of the implementing
regulations, is instructive. One commentator observed:
Applying the MD&A standards to the disclosure of infor-
mation relating to compliance with, or other effects of, the
1990 Amendments will typically result in disclosure by the
affected company in the MD&A. Given the enormity of the
costs associated with bringing facilities into compliance, a
registrant will not typically be able to conclude that a mate-
rial effect on its financial condition is not reasonably likely
to occur, notwithstanding that the specific regulations imple-
menting the provisions of the 1990 Amendments may not
yet have been promulgated.77
Obviously, there are important differences between the problem
just described and the climate change scenario. But both settings
concern the prospect of necessarily sizeable dollar expenditures as
a basic fact of life in environmental compliance, under circum-
stances of considerable uncertainty about the final specific legal
requirements, all accompanied by a certain degree of likelihood, or
even inevitability, of specific regulation. These various observa-
tions indicate that the MD&A requirement should become a real
focus with respect to SEC disclosure in the area of climate change.
c. Description of Business
Item 101 of Regulation S-K requires that a regulated company
describe their business to the SEC.78 Item 101(c)(1)(xii) requires
specific disclosure with respect to important environmental compli-
ance: "[a]ppropriate disclosure also shall be made as to the mate-
rial effects that compliance with [environmental laws and
regulations] may have upon the capital expenditures, earnings and
competitive position of the registrant and its subsidiaries. ' '79
Because the environmental portion of this provision is essen-
tially driven by the need for existing environmental law, it is less
susceptible to disclosure requirements than some others. It is fair
77 STACH, supra note 42, at 2-33.
78 This includes certain financial information, its principal products and services, sources
of raw materials and competitive condition. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2006).
79 Id. at (c)(1)(xii).
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to say, however, that once a company becomes included within a
climate change regime, whether voluntarily or by legal compulsion,
the predictably substantial compliance requirements will very
likely invoke the provision. This is because compliance will require
significant capital expenditures for assets such as emissions control
equipment and emissions credits.8 0 And these, in turn, will entail
substantial, related ongoing costs of operation and management
that could affect earnings and competitive position.
d. Contingent "Loss" Liabilities and Asset Impairments
Another area of potential climate change disclosure frequently
mentioned in discussions and advocacy initiatives is the accounting
concept of contingent liability or asset impairment, along with a
related loss expense. . Specifically, the concept would require
companies that incur either certain potential liabilities that may
become the subject of a valid claim or certain impairments (dam-
age or reduced value) of their assets to reduce their income (a
"loss" expense) by the amount of the potential liability or asset
impairment. Correspondingly, the companies must add a like
amount to the company's list of balance sheet liabilities or reduce
the impaired asset by that like amount.8 2 Companies regulated
under the securities laws must make disclosure filings, including
financial statements prepared in accordance with Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 3 The SEC, which has
primary authority to make accounting rules, tends to rely heavily
on the expertise of "standard-setter" organizations: principally the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).
4
FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards Number 5
(SFAS No. 5), Accounting for Contingencies, is the basic rule con-
trolling accounting treatment of "loss contingencies." When there
is a significant chance that future events will confirm the existence
of a loss, this rule states that a company must "accrue" an appro-
priate liability or asset impairment and correlative expense on its
80 See generally C. GREGORY ROGERS, FINANCIAL REPORTING OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITIES AND RISKS AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY 197-202 (2005).
81 See generally id. at 211-30.
82 See id. at 222-28.
83 Id. at 22-24.
84 See Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Desig:
nated Private-Sector Standard Setter, SEC Release Nos. 33-8221; 34-4774, (April 25, 2003).
Here, the SEC updates Accounting Series Release No. 150, December 20, 1973, in light of
the major reforms made by Sarbanes-Oxley, to reaffirm FASB's status as the "designated
private-sector standard setter" for the SEC.
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books "where information available... indicates that it is probable
that an asset had been impaired or a liability had been incurred at
the date of the financial statements ... [and it is] probable that...
future events will occur confirming the fact of the loss, and where
the amount of loss can be reasonably estimated."85
Much like the disclosure requirement as to legal proceedings, in-
the instance of asset impairments and contingent liabilities, one can
observe that the pertinence of the concept will increase with fur-
ther developments in climate change science and law. In other
words, the more significant and clear the liability, or alternatively,
the more substantial and clear the damage or devaluation of the
asset, the greater the possibility that SFAS No. 5 would apply.
For example, asset impairments and some types of liabilities in
certain business sectors are prominent candidates for climate
change-related loss accrual. Significantly, asset impairments and
contract-based liabilities do not require violation of any laws.
Notable here is the phenomenon of severe weather events, which
are increasingly intense and frequent in recent years and which are
also increasingly attributed at least in part to climate change. As
scientific consensus continues to solidify, some particular business
sectors will be deemed to suffer impairment of their assets or incur-
rence of liabilities because of climate change. Especially pertinent
here are business infrastructure (property damage and devalua-
tion), insurance (increased payout liabilities), oil and gas (property
damage and devaluation), and financial services (impairment of
their often significant investments in these other sectors).
86
Finally, accruals may be required based on specific laws or pro-
spective or actual litigation. In this regard, as discussed in section
II(A)(1)(a) of this Article, the continuing surge of lawsuits in this
area, combined with the trends in the science and the law, make
this "moving target" worthy of the monitoring activities of corpo-
rate managers.
85 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES No. 5. 8(a)-(b) (1997) (emphasis
added). "Probable" is the highest level of likelihood possible under SFAS No. 5. It refers
to scenarios in which confirmation of the loss is "likely to occur." Id. at T 3(b). Where
both elements are not satisfied, disclosures in the notes of the financial statements may be
required. Id. at T 10; FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION
No. 14: REASONABLE ESTIMATION OF THE AMOUNT OF A LOSS, AN INTERPRETATION OF
FASB INTERPRETATION No. 5 1 2-3 (1976).
86 See generally STACH, supra note 42, at 31-37.
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e. Fraudulent Misstatements and Omissions
The anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws generally prohibit
the use of material misstatements and omissions to defraud inves-
tors and the securities markets. Whether in the purchase or sale of
securities, in the exercise of the shareholder vote, or in other exer-
cises of shareholder rights and privileges, these provisions seek to
provide the fundamental protection of investors and securities
markets that is the essence of the securities laws. The following
discussion will be limited to Rule 10b-5-the most frequently
invoked anti-fraud provision-with brief commentary on other
selected anti-fraud provisions.
The most prominent of the anti-fraud provisions that may arise
in the context of environmental disclosure is Rule 10b-5,8 7 promul-
gated under the authority of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.88 This broad, catch-all anti-fraud provision
is applied in a wide range of transactions and business activities in
which complaining parties or the federal government claim a fraud
occurred in the form of a "material" misstatement or omission "in
connection with the purchase or sale of .. . securities." 9
While Rule 10b-5 enjoyed expansive application during its early
years, including court rulings finding implied private rights of
action and its applicability to security-holders of private compa-
nies,90 a series of United States Supreme Court opinions in the
mid-1970s began to interpret the rule more strictly. These latter
rulings grounded their interpretations firmly in the express word-
ing of the statute and rule, thus defining more sharply, and argua-
bly more narrowly, the scope and contours of Rule 10b-5.91 For
example, the only non-governmental plaintiffs with standing to sue
are those who purchased or sold their securities contemporane-
ously with a fraud committed "in connection with" those purchases
or sales. 92 Also, common law elements of fraud, including "scien-
ter," must be pled and proved in a Rule 10b-5 cause of action.93 In
87 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
88 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
89 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
.90 See Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
91 See Cox ET AL., supra note 37, at 940-51 (discussing the Supreme Court's "retrench-
ment" decisions).
92 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975) (holding based
on a reading in the statute and rule limiting their applicability to frauds "in connection with
the purchase or sale" of securities).
93 See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976) (holding that a
private cause of action will not lie under Rule 10b-5 in the absence of an allegation of
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Santa Fe Industries v. Green,94 the Supreme Court finally clarified
that in the absence of "manipulative or deceptive" behavior, claims
based on fiduciary duty and other corporate governance concerns
do not come within the purview of Rule 10b-5. 95
Given the pleading and proof requirements of Rule 10b-5, and
considering the clearly restrictive limitations on its scope to
"manipulative or deceptive" behavior imposed by the Supreme
Court, it would appear that only under rather extreme circum-
stances would it be pertinent to the universe of scenarios being
considered in this Article. Those scenarios are largely concerned
with open, considered decisions not to take action with respect to
climate change or failures to be informed and attentive regarding
the subject. But the other anti-fraud provisions do not necessarily
lead to the same conclusion.
Although the various other securities law anti-fraud provisions
contain matrices of similar and dissimilar elements with considera-
ble-but not complete-overlap, their utility in the scenarios
under discussion will likely depend to some degree on the extent to
which they adopt a scienter or a negligence standard. For example,
Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 is generally viewed as
having a scienter requirement, making it less relevant here. On the
other hand, Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) do not have a scienter requir-
ment, thus making their applicability more plausible. 96 Rule 14a-9,
which is under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and addresses misrepresentations and omissions in proxy
solicitations, is generally viewed as not requiring scienter.
As a final note, the preceding discussion does not imply that
cases proceeding under theories not requiring scienter will be easy.
Elements such as materiality, causation, and damages must be
proved, and until evidence of climate change's impacts becomes
sufficiently material and clear, these provisions will pose
challenges.
"scienter," "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud"). The
Court seized particularly on the language of Section 10(b), prohibiting employment of
"any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance." Id. at 195-96. "Recklessness" has
also been found to be included in the term. See Aaron v. Sec. Exch. Comm., 446 U.S. 680,
686 n.5 (1980); First Interstate Bank of Denver. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 901 (10th Cir. 1992).
94 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1997).
95 Id. at 474.
96 See generally Cox ET AL, supra note 37, at 521-28 (citing Aaron, 446 U.S. 680).
97 Id. at 915-23 (citing Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d
Cir. 1976) and In re Reliance Sec. Litig., 135 F. Supp. 2d 480, 511 (D. Del. 2001) as cases
that appear to constitute the "majority rule.").
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2. The Potential Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley
The "Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protec-
tion Act of 2002" (Sarbanes-Oxley' Act or Act) passed almost
unanimously in Congress and was signed into law by President
George W. Bush on July 30, 2002.98 "Enacted in response to the
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and other recent corporate accounting
scandals, the Act was described by President Bush as incorporating
'the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices
since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.',9 So great was the
Act's impact on corporate governance that there is little room to
deny that corporate governance has been "federalized." 100 The fol-
lowing discussion addresses those provisions of the Act that con-
cern corporate governance and that are pertinent to the subject of
this Article.
Several provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act directly affect cor-
porate governance as regards fiduciaries and company disclosure
obligations:' 0'
" Section 301 of the Act requires that the company's audit
committee be composed exclusively of independent direc-
tors and enhances the powers and responsibilities of that
committee.102
" Sections 302 and 906 of the Act require the company's Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer
(CFO) to "certify," in a prescribed manner, the company's
financial statements that accompany certain disclosure fil-
ings with the SEC and are made publicly available. Signifi-
98 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). The House of
Representatives approved the bill 423-3. 148 CONG. REC. H5480 (daily ed. July 25,
2002). The Senate vote was 99-0. 148 CONG. REC. 57365 (daily ed. July 25, 2002).
99 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (9th ed. Supp.
2005) (citing George W. Bush, Remarks at Signing of Corporate Corruption Bill (July 30,
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730.html).
100 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Director's Fiduci-
ary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 Hous. L. REv. 393, 393-94, 400 ("In an apparent
effort to restore directors' adherence to their fiduciary duty, Sarbanes-Oxley imposes
responsibilities on directors similar to the responsibilities required under state corporate
fiduciary law, appearing to 'federalize' that law."); Karmel, supra note 38, at 80 (citing the
former SEC Commissioner's observation that the Act "markedly changed the boundary
between the federal securities laws and state corporation law with regard to corporate
governance," but she did not attribute this change to the Enron scandals, as "the SEC has
been angling to regulate [corporate governance] for some time.").
101 See COFFEE & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 2-3.
102 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 § 301 (2002) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78j-1 (2002)).
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cant penalties, including criminal sanctions, could apply for
violations.'
0 3
* Section 401 of the Act provides for enhanced disclosure of
information, particularly regarding the accuracy of financial
statements, "off-balance-sheet" transactions and "pro
forma" figures.
10 4
* Section 404 of the Act requires companies to include in each
annual report filed with the SEC an "internal control
report." The report must acknowledge management's
responsibility for establishing and maintaining an adequate
internal control structure and procedures for financial
reporting and it must assess the effectiveness of the struc-
ture and procedures. 105
" Section 406 of the Act requires companies to adopt a Code
of Ethics for senior financial officers, and if they do not
adopt such a code, they must explain why they did not do
SO."°
6
• Section 407 of the Act requires disclosure of the company's
audit committee's "financial expert" and describes generally
the qualifications for such a person.
10 7
* Section 408 of the Act seeks to enhance SEC review of com-
pany disclosures, identifying several categories of companies
of particular susceptibility to problematic disclosures. 0 8
" Section 409 of the Act provides for disclosure, on a "rapid
and current" basis, of information concerning material
changes in the company's financial circumstances.' 0 9
• Titles VIII (Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability),
IX (White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements), and XI
(Corporate Fraud Accountability) contain a number of pro-
visions essentially designed to punish fraudulent and
103 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 §§ 302, 906 (2002)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241, 1350 (2002)).
104 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 § 401 (2002).
105 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 § 404 (2002), (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2002)).
106 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 § 406, (2002), (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7264(2002)).
107 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 §407, (2002), (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2002)).
108 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 §408, (2002), (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7266 (2002)).
109 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 § 409 (2002).
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obstructive behavior, including enhancement of certain
existing penalties.110
Sarbanes-Oxley thus imposes on public corporations and their
fiduciaries an enhanced and heightened set of responsibilities and
creates significant penalties for failure to fulfill those responsibili-
ties. In addition to its particular focus on accounting, auditing, and
financial aspects of the behavior of corporate fiduciaries and other
"gatekeepers," the Act also contributes to a general atmosphere of
greater transparency, awareness, and sensitivity regarding corpo-
rate behavior. Environmental advocates, moreover, are quite
aware of this new climate and view it as a propitious one for pro-
motion of their interests.
It is indeed the general effects on the business climate and the
window of opportunity this presents for strategic maneuvering that
make Sarbanes-Oxley useful to those seeking to press public cor-
porations to address climate change issues. This is in contrast to
the specific objectives of the Act's particular provisions, which
reflect the nature of the events generating the impetus to enact this
legislation. On the latter point, the creation of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, the extensive treatment given to
auditor independence, the particular focus on the audit committee
as opposed to the entire board, the certification requirements, and
the enhanced governmental authority to prosecute and impose
penalties all reflect primarily a concern about financial fraud and
conflicts of interest. This is rightly so, since these problems were at
the heart of the series of embarrassing scandals that commenced
with the Enron matter. As a consequence, the Act cannot be said
to lend itself expressly to issues of a more socially sensitive
nature-unless they also involve significant illegality or are of con-
siderable economic importance. In this sense there are no sur-
prises, as the Act is consistent with previous securities law
policies.1 '
110 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, Titles VIII, IX, XI.
(2002).
Mll See, e.g., Acito v. IMECERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 1995) (no disclosure
violation for failure to disclose that one plant of thirty that were inspected was in violation
of FDA standards because that plant produced only ten of the company's 1,000 distributed
products); In re AES Corp. Sec. Litig., 825 F. Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (company's claims
that it had a good environmental record was a material misstatement where it had illegally
falsified wastewater reports filed with the government); Ballan v. Upjohn Co., 814 F. Supp.
1375, 1385-86 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (touting of a new drug was misleading because the com-
pany failed to disclose that it had illegally withheld information from the FDA regarding
the drug's side effects); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers v. J.P. Stevens & Co.
475 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (company proxy statement seeking election of directors
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Finally, for all the fanfare about the curative effects the Act
promises, it is also criticized severely. Some of these critiques
imply that the Act could produce negative consequences that ulti-
mately could undermine its effectiveness and its generally positive
effect on the tone and tenor of corporate behavior. For example,
Professor Karmel expresses the following concern:
The corporate governance provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are
proscriptive in an area where flexibility has long been val-
ued. Furthermore ... [the Act] is premised to some extent
on an adversarial model of corporate governance in contrast
to a consensus model which has been the prevailing norm in
boardrooms. In changing the orientation of directors,
Sarbanes-Oxley . . . may result in diminished
entrepreneurial activity, corporate profitability and
competitiveness.' 2
Commentators critical of the Act generally declare:
(1) that it was unnecessary, (2) that the changes it made
were at best only incremental, (3) that on balance it was
undesirable because it would impose significant new costs
on US firms, or (4) that it was probably unnecessary because
modern markets were liquid and quite capable of respond-
ing adequately to fraud on their own without additional
regulation.
1 13
Conversely, some commentators are supportive of the Act and
would prefer that it were more stringent.
1 1
4
Hence, the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley did not end the debate
over corporate governance, and indeed many in the corporate
community continue to criticize the Act. Those criticisms have
some potency, if for no other reasons than that the critics include
highly respected members of the corporate community and the
criticisms come during this trial-and-error period, where the stake-
holders-corporate, judicial, regulatory, legislative, non-govern-
was not materially misleading for failing to disclose that all nominees knowingly and will-
fully acted in concert - but not illegally - to thwart the labor laws).
112 Karmel, supra note 38, at 81.
113 ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATIONS 595 (9th ed. 2005)
(also discussing at length a 2004 survey of the costs associated with compliance with
Sarbanes-Oxley requirements).
114 See Fairfax, supra note 100, at 400-07 (complimenting the Act's attempt to restore
directors' fidelity to their fiduciary duties but complaining that while directors are given
extensive responsibility, the Act suffers from a lack of liability for directors). See also Jill
E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using the
Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517, 519-20
(2003) ("Sarbanes-Oxley did not impose federal standards for director liability.").
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mental, and others-have not quite found and fully assumed their
roles. Altogether, the nature and outcome of the very dialogue
about Sarbanes-Oxley, along with any inherent merits and failings
of the Act itself, will have much to do with the overall corporate
governance environment in the future. That is, whether a height-
ened sensitivity to the image and behavior of the corporation con-
tinues or whether it fades away in the face of criticism and
disagreement depends on these considerations. 15 And this out-
come, in turn, will either enhance or limit the efforts of climate
change advocates.
3. Final Observations: Past Corporate Practices
As previously observed, the path of post-Enron reform emanat-
ing from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, including the general environ-
ment of attitudes and policies about corporate governance fostered
by the Act, will surely affect the prospects for success of climate
change advocates. This is particularly true given some of the chal-
lenges to successful application by advocates of many specific
securities law provisions. Unquestionably, continued and rigorous
debate is potentially very useful and is a cherished feature of gov-
ernance in a democratic milieu. But where the fruit of that debate
is a diminution in the level of scrutiny and accountability in corpo-
rate governance, this would only contribute to what, in the view of
many, is a record of less than admirable securities law enforcement
of environmental disclosure.
In a July 2004 Report entitled Environmental Disclosure: SEC
Should Explore Ways to Improve Tracking and Transparency of
Information (GAO Report), the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) reported to Congressional Requesters on the effec-
tiveness of SEC environmental disclosure.116 As to the pertinence
of Sarbanes-Oxley, the GAO Report expressed the view that
"[w]hile the act does not contain provisions that specifically
address environmental disclosure, some of them could lead to
improved reporting of environmental liabilities.""' 7 Overall, how-
115 See HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 113, at 595-600 (citing a number of commenta-
ries on Sarbanes-Oxley, including many critical ones).
116 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: SEC SHOULD
EXPLORE WAYS TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION (2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04808.pdf.
117 Id. at 8 (citing specifically the provisions on real-time disclosures, assessment of
internal controls and financial reporting procedures, certification of financial statements,
and increased funding for SEC review.) The Report notes early on that disclosure require-
ments turn, "[a]mong other things," on the existence of "material" information, such as
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ever, the Report was neither definitive nor conclusive on the sub-
ject of SEC environmental disclosure.
The Report admits that "[l]ittle is known about the extent to
which companies are disclosing environmental information in their
filings with [the] SEC, despite many efforts to study ... [the sub-
ject] over the past 10 years. '"118 The key stakeholders participating
in the study included "representatives of the accounting and audit-
ing profession, environmental consultants and attorneys, invest-
ment and financial services, the insurance industry, environmental
interest groups, public employee pension funds, and credit rating
agencies, among others." '119 These representatives disagreed about
whether the disclosure requirements were well defined. Stakehold-
ers critical of the SEC rules either believed they were not specific
enough, especially as to environmental obligations that were uncer-
tain in amount or in likelihood of occurrence, or they believed that
the SEC's oversight and enforcement of existing rules was lax.
120
On the other hand, stakeholders who thought the rules were
acceptable emphasized the importance of flexibility in accommo-
dating the variability among companies' and industries' circum-
stances.1 2' Because of the disagreement and because so little is
known about actual environmental disclosure, the Report recom-
mended that the SEC take certain steps to improve the tracking
and transparency of information on environmental matters.
1 22
The Report also addressed the specific subject of company dis-
closure related to climate change. Discussions with SEC officials
"significant changes in accounting practices or potential risks or liabilities, such as the cost
of a major environmental cleanup, that could affect future earnings." Id. at 1-2.
118 Id. at 4.
119 Id. at 3.
120 Critics of SEC environmental disclosure rules and policies express their views
through their own reports and publications. See, e.g., MICHELLE CHAN-FISHEL, FRIENDS
OF THE EARTH, THIRD SURVEY OF CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS (2004),
available at http://www.foe.org/camps/intl/corpacct/wallstreet/secsurvey2004.pdf; DOUGLAS
G. COGAN, CERES/IRRC, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE: MAKING
THE CONNECTION (2003), available at http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/grocc/docu-
ments/Cerescorp-gov and-climatechange sr_0306.pdf; SUSANNAH BLAKE GOODMAN &
TIM LITTLE, THE ROSE FOUND. FOR CMTYS AND THE ENV'T , THE GAP IN GAAP: AN
EXAMINATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING LOOPHOLES (2003), available at http://
www.rosefdn.org/images/GAPinGAAP.pdf; SANFORD LEWIS & TIM LITTLE, THE ROSE
FOUND. FOR CMTYS AND THE ENV'T, FOOLING INVESTORS & FOOLING THEMSELVES: How
AGGRESSIVE CORPORATE ACCOUNTING & ASSET MANAGEMENT TACTICS CAN LEAD To
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING FRAUD (2004), available at http://www.rosefdn.org/fooling.
pdf.
121 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 116, at 3-5, 9-15.
122 Id. at 36-37.
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yielded the following insight about whether SEC rules require dis-
closure at the present time:
While various investor organizations, pension fund manag-
ers, and environmental interest groups have called on com-
panies to make more information available on this subject,
disclosures about the impact of potential greenhouse gas con-
trols are not necessarily required at this time, according to
officials at [the] SEC's Division of Corporation Finance,
because controls do not appear imminent at the federal level
through ratification of the Kyoto Protocol or legislation. At
the same time, the officials did not rule out such disclosures,
commenting that there may be circumstances in which a com-
pany can identify a material impact and must disclose it in the
filing.' 
23
Noting that "[s]ome companies have opted to include informa-
tion regarding potential controls over greenhouse gas emissions in
their SEC filings, partly in response to public interest,' 1 24 the
Report describes its findings about those filings. Overall, the fil-
ings varied greatly in type of disclosure and level of detail, tending
not to estimate the dollar value of climate change impacts and
expressing uncertainly about the nature of the impacts, but also
tending to indicate that the impacts "could be material."'1 25 One of
the obvious reasons for the lack of uniformity or depth of these
disclosures was the fact that they have generally been voluntary
and thus viewed as "not necessarily required.
126
The GAO Report, limited in it revelations and recommenda-
tions, still advances the state of knowledge about regulation and
governance in the climate change area. The act of assembling the
key stakeholders in order to discern their views, discussing the
rationales for those views, and compiling their recommendations
for regulatory reform was itself an important step in an area that is
taking shape in slow, complicated stages. Important also was the
Report's description of some corporate practices, which, for all
their limitations from the perspective of the standards that would
be imposed by a full-blown regulatory scheme, essentially reflect
the "best practices" in the field of climate change corporate
governance.
123 Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added).
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B. State Corporate Fiduciary Duty Law and Climate Change: Is
There, or Could There Soon Be, a Fiduciary Duty to
Investigate and Monitor GHG Emissions, or Take
Other Action?
In shareholder proposals submitted to major corporations in
recent years, advocacy groups assert that corporate boards of direc-
tors and managers have a "fiduciary duty" to become informed,
and to inform shareholders, about potential climate change risks
and opportunities. 127 For example, shareholder proposals submit-
ted to Caterpillar, Conoco Phillips, Cummins, Gillette, Nexen,
Occidental Petro-Canada, Reebok, and Staples in 2003 made the
following declaration:
Because scientific assessment of the human contribution to
climate change is now widely accepted, and legislation, regu-
lation, litigation, and other responses to climate change are
foreseeable, we believe, prudent management has a fiduciary
duty to carefully assess and disclose to shareholders all perti-
nent information on significant risks associated with climate
change .... We believe this proposal is consistent with the
fiduciary duties of the corporation's officers and directors,
and with good environmental and risk management.
128
Indeed, some corporations are responding affirmatively to these
and other types of shareholder demands. In December 2005, Ford
Motor Company, following a 2004 shareholder proposal, published
"the industry's first report dedicated to the issue of climate change
and its effect on the automotive industry.' 1 29 In the Report, Ford
asserted that "At Ford, the issue is not abstract. . . .The issue
warrants precautionary, prudent and early actions to enhance our
127 Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007) (promulgated pursuant to Section 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, provides, under certain defined circumstances, for the
submission of proposals by shareholders for consideration and vote at shareholders meet-
ings). Such proposals have long been strategic vehicles for corporate governance and cor-
porate social responsibility initiatives. See Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. Sec.
Exchange Comm., 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Patricia R. Uhlenbrock, Note, Roll Out
the Barrel: The SEC Reverses Its Stance on Employment-Related Shareholder Proposals
Under Rule 14a-8-Again, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 277, 308 (2000).
128 Interfaith Ctr. on Corp. Responsibility, Proposed Shareholder Resolution on
Embedded Climate Risk (emphasis. added), available at www.iccr.org/shareholder/proxy-
book03/environment/climaterisk-oxy.htm. The proposal urges shareholder approval of a
resolution requiring that "the Board of Directors prepare a report (at reasonable cost and
omitting proprietary information), available to shareholders ... describing the operating,
financial and reputational risks to the company associated with past, present, and future
greenhouse gas emissions from its operations and products." Id.
129 FORD REPORT ON THE BUSINESS IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2005), available at
http://media.ford.com/downloads/05_climate.pdf.
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competitiveness and protect our profitability in an increasingly car-
bon-constrained economy."
1 30
Were the company and its fiduciaries under a legal duty to act, or
did this action emanate from public relations or political considera-
tions?13' The question is pertinent for a number of reasons, not the
least being increasing institutional shareholder interest, increas-
ingly affirmative corporate responses with those responses often
characterized as "best practices," and the recent trend toward the
use of litigation as a means of forcing corporate action on climate
change. As the following discussion demonstrates, attempts to
describe the law of fiduciary duty as imposing obligations on direc-
tors and officers in this arena will encounter substantial obstacles,
the most notable being the venerable (or infamous, depending on
one's view of it) "business judgment rule." At the same time, cer-
tain currents and trends in the law contemplating higher standards
of fiduciary conduct, (particularly in this post-Enron legal environ-
ment) as well as the apparent trajectory of climate change informa-
tion toward the status of legal "materiality," make consideration of
the subject a justifiable exercise.
1. Fiduciary Duty: Standards for Decision-making and
Monitoring
The law of fiduciary duty establishes a standard of conduct that
guides directors, officers, and others in the performance of their
corporate responsibilities, and it also provides a standard of review
that determines when those fiduciaries should be held personally
liable for inadequate performance. 32 Fiduciary duties of directors
130 Id. at 2.
131 A critical distinction here is that between (1) whether some decision to act that the
fiduciaries agree upon (such as taking action on climate change) comes within their author-
ity, where such coverage protects them from liability for having so acted, and (2) whether
the directors have a duty to act-but do not- for which a breach would subject them to
liability. This article focuses on the duties of fiduciaries, since the typical scenario for
advocates is one in which they, in their capacities as shareholders, are seeking ways to
force action by fiduciaries through claims that their fiduciary duties require action. In cor-
porate law, the former situation is often discussed in terms of directors' authority to
address the interests of "other," or "non-shareholder" constituencies or stakeholders,
since the principal issue raised in serving interests of employees, suppliers, communities,
and the like is whether directors have exceeded their authority. See, e.g., 15 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 1715 (2007); AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
& RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (Mike Greenwald, ed. 1994); James J. Hanks, Jr., Non-Stock-
holder Constituency Statutes: An Idea Whose Time Should Never Have Come, INSIGrs,
Dec. 1989, at 20.
132 As to the difference between standards of conduct and standards of review in fiduci-
ary duty law, see the REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §8.31 cmt. (2005) ("[W]hile a
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flow from the fundamental mandate in corporate law that "[a]ll
corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of
the board of directors of the corporation, and the business and
affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direc-
tion of, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors. "133
Generally, standards of conduct require that each director act
"in good faith ... .. in a manner the director reasonably believes to
be in the best interests of the corporation" and entire boards and
committees must execute their decision-making and oversight func-
tions "with the care that a person in a like position would reasona-
bly believe appropriate under similar circumstances." '34 Similarly,
fiduciary duty standards of review for purposes of determining
director liability provide generally that such liability shall apply,
unless precluded by law,135 when a director's conduct:
" was not in good faith;136 or
" resulted in a decision that the director either "did not rea-
sonably believe to be in the [corporation's] best interests" or
"as to which the director was not informed to an extent the
director reasonably believed appropriate in the circum-
stances; ' ' 137 or
" was tainted by conflict of interest, other lack of indepen-
dence, or receipt of an improper financial benefit; 138 or
* was the result of a "sustained failure of the director to
devote attention to ongoing oversight of the business and
affairs of the corporation, or a failure to devote timely
director whose performance meets the standards of [conduct of] section 8.30 should have
no liability, the fact that a director's performance fails to reach that level does not automat-
ically establish personal liability for damages that the corporation may have suffered as a
consequence."); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Stan-
dards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993).
133 REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §8.01(b). See also DEL CODE ANN. tit.5 § 141(a)
(2007) providing that "[t]he business and affairs of every corporation organized under this
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors..." For a
discussion of differences among corporate statutory formulations and the rationale for the
approach of the Revised Model Business Coporation Act (RMBCA) approach, see
REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.30 cmt. Corporate officers and other fiduciaries are
appointed by or under the authority of the board of directors and are subject to fiduciary
duties. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr §§ 8.40, 8.41, 8.42 (setting forth perti-
nent officer appointment and conduct provisions).
134 REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b).
135 See id. at §§ 8.31(a)(1), 8.31(a)(1) cmt. (identifying limitation of liability provisions
such as those provided for in §2.04(b)(4) and conflict of interest safe harbors such as those
provided for in § 8.61).
136 Id. at § 8.31 (a)(2)(i).
137 Id. at § 8.31(a)(2)(A), (B).
138 Id. at § 8.31 (a)(2)(iii), (v).
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attention, by making (or causing to be made) appropriate
inquiry, when particular facts and circumstances of signifi-
cant concern materialize that would alert a reasonably
attentive director to the need therefore.'
'1 39
At first glance, one might suppose that the directors of relevant
American corporations who do not take action regarding climate
change are prime candidates for fiduciary duty liability. After all,
one could say that these directors, after ignoring or rejecting
demands by shareholders to act, acted "not in good faith,"1 40 or
that when they made that decision they either "did not reasonably
believe [it] to be in the [corporation's] best interests" or were "not
informed to an extent ... reasonably believed to be appropriate in
the circumstances.'
14 1
Further, in light of the high profile of climate change issues in
recent years, one might query whether it is still possible to assign
fault to the directors for not being independently attentive to the
subject, even where no shareholder demands are made. Specifi-
cally, does not the growing publicity and consensus about climate
change, including readily available analyses of the specific threats
posed, form a basis for accusing directors of a general "sustained
failure ...to devote attention to ongoing oversight of the busi-
ness"?142 Or, have these same developments not revealed the exis-
tence of "particular facts and circumstances of significant
concern . . that would alert a reasonably attentive director to the
need" for action," thereby requiring that they "devote timely
attention, by making (or causing to be made) appropriate
inquiry"?
1 4 3
The preceding analysis, however plausible it may appear as a
legal interpretation, must surmount an imposing body of corporate
law and jurisprudence. Notably, several corporate law concepts
reflect the law's firm embrace of policies holding that judges are
not business experts and that there should be sufficient protection
of directors from liability to attract and retain talented profession-
als who will have the freedom to take the risks that often attend
high returns on investment.
139 Id. at § 8.31(a)(2)(iv).
140 Id. at § 8.31 (a)(2)(i).
141 Id. at § 8.31(a)(2)(A), (B).
142 Id. at § 8.31(a)(2)(iv).
143 Id. at § 8.31(a)(2)(iv).
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2. Application to Climate Change
a. Traditional Fiduciary-Protective Policies
Contentions that director decisions to not take any action related
to climate change violate the fiduciary duty of care must confront
and survive the "business judgment rule."' 44 The rule applies spe-
cifically to decisions made by directors, and it is described as a pre-
sumption that "in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis .... and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company [and
its shareholders]." 145
Importantly, this rule of judicial self restraint addresses the pro-
cess leading to the board's decision and not the content of that deci-
sion. Courts will not interfere with the decision as long as the
process was "either deliberately considered. .. or was otherwise
rational.' 46  Such an approach provides considerable berth to
directors to take risks, even if doing so results in losses to the
corporation:
[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the
fact believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of
wrong extending through "stupid" to "egregious" or "irra-
tional," provides no ground for director liability, so long as
the court determines that the process employed was either
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corpo-
rate interests.
1 47
This protective policy finds broad support in the authorities,
right down to interpretations given to key terms. Thus, conduct
not in "good faith" by a board is described as that in which a board
"lacked an actual intention to advance corporate welfare.' 1 48
Requirements that directors have a "reasonable belief" that a deci-
144 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) ("[A] conscious decision to refrain
from acting may nonetheless be a [decision, and in appropriate circumstances, one that is
a] .. .valid exercise of business judgment.").
145 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 747 (Del. Ch. 2005) (citing
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). See AM. LAW INST, supra note 131
§§ 4.01(c), 4.01 cmt. (a) (2005). See also MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr §8.31 cmt. note on the
Business Judgement Rule (2005) ("[The MBCA] does not codify the business judgment
rule as a whole . . .[I]t would not be desirable to freeze the concept in a statute [as it
continues to be developed by the courts] ... [But] its principal elements ... are embedded
in [§ 8.31 (a)(2)].).
146 In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A. 2d. 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (citing
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Gagliardi v. TriFoods, Int'l Inc., 683 A. 2d
1049 (Del. Ch. 1996)).
147 In re Caremark , 698 A. 2d at 967.
148 Gagliardi, 683 A. 2d at 1051.
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sion was in the corporation's best interests, or that the directors
were "informed" when making a decision to an extent "reasonably
believed appropriate," are similarly permissively interpreted. 14 9
Hence, "so long as it is his or her honest and good faith belief, a
director has wide discretion." 150 Liability appears to lie only "in
the rare case where a decision ... is so removed from the realm of
reason (e.g., corporate waste), or a belief as to the sufficiency of
the director's preparation to make an informed judgment is so
unreasonable as to fall outside the permissible bounds of sound
discretion .... "151
The business judgment rule does not apply to monitoring or
oversight duties in which no decision is being made. This function,
in contrast to the decision-making function, "involves ongoing
monitoring of the corporation's business and .affairs over a period
of time. This involves the duty of ongoing attention, When actual
knowledge of particular facts and circumstances arouse suspicions
which indicate a need to make inquiry. 1 52 Again, however, the
bar is not set exceedingly high. "Directorial management does not
require a detailed inspection of day-to-day activities, but rather a
general monitoring of corporate affairs and policies. '153 The duty
to inquire about suspicious matters is also articulated in restrictive
terms:
[E]mbedded in the oversight function is the need to inquire
when suspicions are aroused. This duty ... does not entail
proactive vigilance, but arises when, and only when, particu-
lar facts and circumstances of material concern (e.g. evi-
dence of embezzlement at a high level or the discovery of
significant inventory shortages) suddenly surface.154
Notable here are the linguistic formulations (only "suspicious"
matters create a specific duty of inquiry, and only a "general" duty
of monitoring is imposed in normal circumstances), as well as the
types of examples usually offered. Regarding both as to the busi-
ness judgment rule applicable to director decisions and the law of
"unconsidered inaction" in directorial oversight, 55 the traditional,
149 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 cmt. note on the Business Judgement Rule.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.; Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981) ("Directors are
under a continuing obligation to keep infoimed about the activities of the corporation...
Directors may not shut their eyes to corporate misconduct.").
153 Francis, 432 A.2d at 822 (citing Williams v. McKay, 18 A. 824, 828 (N.J Ch. 1889)).
154 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31, cmt. note on the business judgment rule.
155 In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A. 2d. 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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restrictive approach to fiduciary duty may not embrace a duty to
address climate change developments, at least not at the present
state of knowledge.
To this body of law must also be added certain other corporate
law concepts that pose challenges to shareholders seeking to
impose certain desirable conduct on fiduciaries. These include (1)
the right of directors, in pursuit of their duties, to rely on the
opinion, reports, and the like, of officers, attorneys, and other
experts, and to thereby limit their exposure; 156 (2) procedural dis-
advantages facing plaintiffs in shareholder derivative suits,
notably the possibility that those suits can be disposed of with-
out trial based on the "business judgment" of the board or of a
special board committee; 57 (3) statutory provisions allowing the
limitation-or the virtual elimination-of director monetary liabil-
ity for breaches of the fiduciary duty of care; 158 and (4) indemnifi-
156 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141(e) (2007):
[A director] shall, in the performance of such [director's] duties, be fully pro-
tected in relying in good faith upon the [corporate] records.. .and upon such
information, opinion, reports or statements presented to the corporation
by... officers... employees.., or [an expert] ... who has been selected with
reasonable care by ... the corporation.
See also MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr §§ 8.30 (d), 8.30 cmt. (2005). These protective provisions
recognize, among other things, that directors qua directors are not employees of the corpo-
ration and they do not come to work each day. They meet anywhere between a few times
to several times a year. Thus, the thinking goes, their ability to acquire information and
investigate is accordingly limited and so, to some degree, should be their liability exposure.
157 See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 515-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Del. 1984); Dennis J. Block & H. Adam Prussin, Termination of
Derivative Suits Against Directors on Business Judgment Grounds: From Zapata to Aron-
son, 39 Bus. LAW. 1503 (1984); Fairfax, supra note 100, at 408-09 (discussing the require-
ment in many jurisdictions that before suing, a shareholder must make a "demand" on the
board to take curative action: "[W]hether demand is made or excused, the board of direc-
tors, as an entire body or through a committee, generally determines that suits against
directors should not proceed."); cf Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A. 2d 779 (Del. 1981)
(supporting a "middle course between... yield[ing] to the independent business judgment
of a board committee and ... unbridled plaintiff stockholder control" over a derivative
suit, id. at 788) (limited by Aronson, 473 A.2d at 805).
158 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2007); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
634 A. 2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993); MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr §§ 2.02(b)(4), 2.02 cmt.; William
T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr, Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Stan-
dards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 1287, 1302 (2001); Fairfax,
supra note 100, at 412-13 ("[T]hese statutes not only severely reduce the threat of director
liability, but also 'minimize the opportunity for courts to patrol and reinforce the bounda-
ries of business judgment."' (quoting Mae Kuykendall, Symmetry and Dissonance in Cor-
porate Law: Perfecting the Exoneration of Directors, Corrupting Indemnification and
Straining the Framework of Corporate Law, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 443, 479)); Stephen
A. Radin, Director Protection Statutes After Malpiede and Emerald Partners, BUs. AND
SEC. LITIGATOR (Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 2002, at 1-3.
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cation provisions, as well as director and officer liability
insurance. 59
Finally, although "best practices" standards reflect leadership in
the development and application of progressive policies addressing
important problems, they may not thereby become the acceptable
legal standard of conduct and review. This is made clear in Dela-
ware case law:
Aspirational ideals of good corporate governance practices
for boards of directors that go beyond the minimal legal
requirements of the corporation law are highly desirable,
often tend to benefit stockholders, sometimes reduce litiga-
tion and usually help directors avoid liability. But they are
not required by the corporation law and do not define stan-
dards of liability.'6
The foregoing description of the nature and structure of state
corporate fiduciary law is the subject of lively debate about
whether corporate law, in particular Delaware corporate law, is
engaged in a "race to the bottom.' 6' Yet, notwithstanding the.
foregoing, certain trends and currents in the law over recent
decades suggest that courts may be interpreting fiduciary duties of
directors and officers more strictly, and these developments
deserve commentary.
159 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2007); Fairfax, supra note 100, at 413 ("These
provisions for indemnification combine with D&O insurance to solidify the virtual obliter-
ation of director liability."); Joseph P. Monteleone & John F. McCarrick, Directors' and
Officers' Liability, A D&O Policy Road Map: The Coverage Exclusions, INSIGHTS, July
1993, at 7, 8.
160 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000) (emphasis added) (cited in In re The
Walt Disney Company Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745 n.399 (Del. Ch. 2005)).
161 Critics over the years have accused Delaware of maintaining a director/management-
friendly regime of corporate law, to the disadvantage of shareholders and others and in the
interest of raising substantial revenues from incorporations. See, e.g., William L. Cary,
Federalism and the Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 683-685
(1974); William L. Cary, A Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum Standards Act, 29 Bus.
LAW. 1101, 1102-11.03 (1975); Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's General Corpo-
ration Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249 (1976); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the
Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969);. Others disagree with
this view. See, e.g., RALPH K. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 9 (1978); S.
Samuel Arsht, A History of Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1976); S.
Samuel Arsht, Reply to Professor Cary, 31 Bus. LAW. 1113 (1976).
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b. Countervailing Considerations and Trends: Caremark,
Sarbanes-Oxley, and Other Drivers of Higher State Law
Standards for Corporations and Their Fiduciaries
Against this background of fiduciary-protective law and jurispru-
dence, there are influential court decisions, legislative and regula-
tory enactments, and policy pronouncements that are read by some
to favor an expansion of monitoring and oversight duties for direc-
tors and other fiduciaries. In the category of court decisions, none
has more impact than In re Caremark Inter'l Inc. Derivative
Litigation.'62
In Caremark, the plaintiffs launched shareholder derivative
actions against a public corporation's board of directors, claiming
that the directors breached their duty of care in connection with
certain corporate criminal violations of state and federal laws
applicable to health care providers. Seeking, on the company's
behalf, to recover amounts paid out in civil and criminal fines and
other payments, the plaintiffs claimed that the directors breached
their duties of "attention or care . .. [by allowing] a situation to
develop and continue which exposed the corporation to enormous
legal liability." According to the plaintiffs, they had a duty "to be
active monitors of corporate performance.'
'1 63
Chancellor Allen, in approving a proposed settlement, discussed
that aspect of fiduciary duty involving directorial monitoring or
oversight of companies. Notably, the discussion was widely viewed
as setting a higher standard of conduct and review in this area than
that previously established in the highly-regarded case Graham v.
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. 164 Graham, which like
Caremark involved a shareholder derivative claim of fiduciary duty
breach for failure to monitor that was commenced in the wake of
criminal prosecution, was known for its "red flag" theory of direc-
tor oversight duty. There, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld
the chancery court's denial of a claim that the directors, "even
though they had no knowledge of any suspicion of wrongdoing on
the part of the company's employees, they still should have put
into effect a system of watchfulness." In doing so, the Graham
court made the following observation:
[D]irectors are entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity
of their subordinates until something occurs to put them on
162 698 A. 2d. 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
163 Id. at 966.
164 188 A. 2d 125 (Del. Ch. 1963).
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suspicion that something is wrong... [A]bsent cause for sus-
picion there is no duty upon the directors to install and
operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out
wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists.
165
Chancellor Allen's discussion of Graham's red flag theory is
remarkable in that, as a chancery court, it effectively interpreted a
Delaware Supreme Court ruling in a manner that would broaden
the scope of the fiduciary duty of monitoring and oversight beyond
what a literal (but fair) reading of the Graham opinion might sug-
gest. 166 To support his interpretation, Chancellor Allen relied upon
his own view of how the Delaware Supreme Court would interpret
Graham at the time of his opinion and also on certain develop-
ments in the larger body of laws that affect corporate behavior.
His use of his sense of how a 1996 Supreme Court would interpret
the 1963 Supreme Court is noteworthy: "A broader interpretation
of Graham v. Allis Chalmers - that it means that a corporate board
has no responsibility to assure that appropriate information and
reporting systems are established by management - would
not.. .be accepted by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1996, in my
opinion. "167
Caremark further supports its view advancing the importance of
monitoring systems by noting generally that "in recent years the
Delaware Supreme Court has made... clear... the seriousness with
which the corporation law views the role of the corporate
board.' 1 68 Chancellor Allen also looked beyond state corporation
law proper, to the "potential impact of the federal organizational
sentencing guidelines on any business organization." '169 Hence, the
Caremark court opined that "a director's obligation includes a duty
to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and
reporting system . . . exists, and that failure to do so under some
circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director lia-
165 Id. at 129.
166 The Graham court made its point more than once in the opinion. For example: "[W]e
know of no rule of law which requires a corporate director to assume, with no justification
whatsoever, that all corporate employees are incipient violators who, but for a tight check-
rein, will give free vent to their unlawful propensities." 188 A.2d at 130-131.
167 In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969-970 (emphasis added).
168 Id. at 970 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) and Paramount
Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993)). Chancellor Allen further
"note[s] the elementary fact that relevant and timely information is an essential predicate
for satisfaction of the board's supervisory and monitoring role under Section 141 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law." Id.
169 Id. See Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, §212(a)(2) (1984), 18 U.S.C.
§§3551-3656.
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ble. .... ,,170 Although the language is very. guarded and circum-
scribed and the court was only a court of first instance, Caremark
certainly contributed to the currents in legal thought and policy
seeking to impose higher levels of responsibility on fiduciaries of
corporations. 171 Importantly, the Delaware Supreme Court later
acknowledged and adopted the Caremark standard in Stone v.
Ritter. 
172
Commentators identify the influence of developments in other
areas of law and policy as having an influence on expansionist
views of the scope of fiduciary duty in state corporate law and pol-
icy. The Caremark court's strong embrace of and reliance on the
Sentencing Reform Act and the U.S. Sentencing Commission's
Sentencing Guidelines is a prominent example. On this point,
Chancellor Allen observes that "[t]he Guidelines offer powerful
incentives for corporations today to have in place compliance pro-
grams to detect violations of law, promptly to report violations to
appropriate public officials when discovered, and to take prompt,
voluntary remedial efforts.
1 73
Similarly, some cite the work of the American Law Institute's
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommenda-
tions and the American Bar Association's work on the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act and the Corporate Director's Guidebook as
encouraging higher standards of conduct for fiduciaries.
174
"Corporate reform has been a recurring theme throughout the
twentieth century," ' 5 and federal securities laws, including Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations, are a constant
force in this process. From the post-Great Depression "New Deal"
reforms of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, through the various reforms
170 Id. (emphasis added).
171 See H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director's Compliance Oversight Responsibility
in the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2001) ("Although a definitive state-
ment regarding a director's liability must await a decision of the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware, the Chancellor's views in this regard finds substantial support."); Mark J.
Lowenstein, The Corporate Director's Duty of Oversight, 27 CoLo. LAW. 33 (1998) ("While
a Chancery opinion is typically of lesser precedential value than a Supreme Court opinion,
the age of the Graham decision, Chancellor Allen's prominence, and the force of his
opinion all suggest otherwise."). Some commentators, however, believe that "[plost-
Caremark decisions indicate that shareholder litigation against directors and officers con-
tinues to be a tough road." HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 113, at 711 (citing Salsitz v.
Nasser, 208 F.R.D. 589 (E.D. Mich 2002)).
172 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 365 (Del. 2006).
173 In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A. 2d. 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996).
174 See generally Brown, supra note 171, at 64-70 (commenting on the ALI principles
generally and their consistency with Caremark and commenting on the ABA's work).
175 Id. at 32.
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addressing the scandal-plagued 1970s and 1980s, 176 to the post-
Enron reforms, these federal measures are often viewed as having
both direct and indirect impacts on corporate standard setting.
Caremark is only one of numerous examples of the impact of fed-
eral law reform on state law. Notably, commentators express the
view that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and related reforms provide the
latest and most prominent example of federal activity that attracts
the attention of state courts1 77 and judges in matters of corporate
governance. For example, former Delaware Chancellor Allen, now
a law professor at New York University, made the observation that
"[i]t would not be unreasonable to assume that the Delaware
courts are responding to the Enron and WorldCom headlines and
the intrusion, so to speak, of the federal government into the inter-
nal governance of corporations." '178
Therefore, any analysis of the question whether fiduciary duty
law requires at least initial investigatory action with respect to cli-
mate change must not only take into account the traditional fiduci-
ary-protective approach of corporate law but also must consider
recent influences that can be seen as potentially expanding those
.duties. Although the weight of tradition might well carry the day
were the question of the applicability of fiduciary duty law to cli-
mate change issues pressed in the courts, the issue is not entirely
out of the question. Moreover, this observation will become
increasingly more relevant with the accelerating pace of scientific
knowledge about climate change and the consequent responses to
this pace.
176 See id. at 32-63 (discussing the role of federal law in addressing problematic corpo-
rate conduct).
177 See, e.g., In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286-87 (Del. Ch.
2003)(opining that neither the business judgment rule nor the exculpatory force of DGCL
§ 102(b)(7) would ward off director liability for "acts or omissions not undertaken honestly
and in good faith, or which involve intentional misconduct."); Fairfax, supra note 100, at
415-20 ("[T]here is evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley may play a role in increasing director
liability by altering the manner in which state courts view exculpatory statutes." Id. at 416
(referring to the focus on the "good faith" element by the court in Walt Disney)). See also
Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 457 (2004) (analyzing
the "emerging duty of good faith and its potential for curbing abuses such as those seen in
the past few years," and noting that "[d]uring the last few years... an important common-
law change has emerged indicating that at least the Delaware judiciary is at work in this
area," presumably in part as a result of pressure from federal reforms."); Id. at 459 (citing
E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate governance and the Professional
Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 443 (2003) ("[T]here are emerging federal
statutory duties and SEC Rules ... that may trump Delaware fiduciary law .
178 Marc Gunther, Boards Beware!, FORTUNE, Nov.10, 2003, at 171.
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CONCLUSION
If anything is clear, it is that the debate and discussion about
climate change will only continue to grow, and the policies and
practices of governmental and corporate actors are very likely to
follow suit. At the same time, while certain trends in both science
and the law are undeniable, there is much that is yet to be known.
Advocacy groups will use legal duties where they can, and will
combine their legal strategies with political, economic, and public
relations pressure. Corporate and governmental actors' positions
are emerging in an increasingly complex manner, with a number of
them veering away from the original tendency to resist proactive
analyses and policies about climate change.
This Article attempts to set out, in as objective and clear-headed
a fashion as possible, the pertinent legal concepts and their likely
application to the (present and emerging) facts. The hope is that
all "stakeholders" in the climate change dialogue will profit from
this analysis and proceed with the development of policies and
practices truly in the best interests of all involved.
[Vol. 26:293
